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Developments in Florida's Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity
LARRY A. KLEIN* AND BRAD A. CHALKER**
Since Florida waived its governmental immunity in tort
actions by enacting section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes, there
has been much controversy over the extent of this waiver. The
decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in 1979 in Commer-
cial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County developed a four-
pronged test for determining when a governmental entity act-
ing in a governmental capacity would still be liable under the
statute. In this article the authors examine the Commercial
Carrier test and survey the Florida cases applying it. The au-
thors also discuss several significant legislative amendments to
section 768.28, and the 1979 and 1980 Florida cases that have
construed the statute.
. TIlE KING CAN Do No W RONG ................................... ...... 999
II. FLORIDA C ASE LAW ........................ ..................... ...... 1000
III. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS .............................................. 1010
IV . C O NCLUSION ........................................................... 1017
I. "THE KING CAN Do No WRONG"
That ancient maxim is often associated with the still prevalent
doctrine that a sovereign is immune from suit for its tortious acts.1
Despite their democratic tradition, most American states have in-
corporated the sovereign immunity doctrine into their common law
heritage or constitutions. 2 The eleventh amendment to the United
States Constitution, moreover, expressly exempts the states from
suits by private citizens in federal court.'
* Attorney-at-Law; former member of University of Florida Law Review.
** J.D., University of Miami School of Law; former member of the University of
Miami Law Review.
1. See Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1926).
The concept that "the King can do no wrong," generally believed to have been an axiom of
the common law, did not arise until "the Tudor despotism when much nonsense about the
immaculate King of trancendental perogative and goodness was purveyed." Id. at 31.
2. See Comment, Sovereign Immunity in Contract Suits: Victim of Judicial Abroga-
tion in Iowa, 59 IowA L. REV. 360, 360 (1973).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
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Florida recognizes state sovereign immunity in its case law and
by implication in its constitution." Article ten of the Florida Con-
stitution authorizes the Florida legislature to abrogate this immu-
nity by enacting "general law for bringing suit against the state."5
In 1973 Florida exercised its authority under this constitutional
provision to waive its sovereign immunity in tort.6 Section 768.28
of the Florida Statutes now exposes Florida to liability "for tort
claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances."'7 Although this waiver ap-
pears self-explanatory at first glance, its language still demands ju-
dicial interpretation. The purpose of this article is to survey the
cases defining the scope of the statute and endorsing the present
viability of the concept of sovereign tort immunity in Florida.
II. FLORIDA CASE LAW
In 1979 the Supreme Court of Florida defined the scope of the
statutory waiver of municipal sovereign immunity in two factually
similar cases. In the two cases, Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian
River County8 and Cheney v. Dade County,9 defendants in traffic
accident suits filed third-party complaints against the named coun-
ties for negligent failure to maintain intersections.1" The trial
courts dismissed both third-party complaints for failure to state a
claim under the sovereign immunity doctrine.11 The District Court
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
4. See, e.g., Valdez v. State Rd. Dep't, 189 So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Pereira
v. State Rd. Dep't, 178 So. 2d 626, 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965); FLA. CONST. art X, § 13 ("Provi-
sion may be made by general law for bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities now
existing or hereafter originating").
5. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13.
6. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-313, § 1 (current version codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5)
(1981)). The statute took effect in 1974 for the state's executive departments, and in 1975
for all other agencies and subdivisions. FLA. STAT. § 768.30 (1981).
7. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1981).
8. 342 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), rev'd, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
9. 353 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), rev'd sub nom. Commercial Carrier Corp. v.
Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
10. Commercial Carrier involved a vehicular collision at an unmarked intersection. The
plaintiffs alleged that there had previously been a stop sign and pavement markings at the
intersection. 371 So. 2d at 1013. In Cheney the plaintiff-accident victim contended that
Dade County had negligently maintained a traffic light. Id.
11. Each motion to dismiss included the allegation that the defendants (third-party
plaintiffs) failed to comply with the notice requirement of FLA. STAT. § 768.28(6) (1981),
which provides in part:
An action shall not be instituted on a claim against the state or one of its
agencies or subdivisions unless the claimant presents the claim in writing to the
[Vol. 35:9991000
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of Appeal, Third District, affirmed, holding that no cause of action
existed for the counties' allegedly negligent acts in either case. The
Supreme Court of Florida consolidated the two cases for review
under the name Commercial Carrier v. Indian River County.12 In
reinstating the two third-party complaints, the court criticized the
Third District for narrowly construing the statutory waiver of sov-
ereign immunity, and expressly disapproved of the trial court's de-
cisions in the cases below.1" The court labeled as "circuitous" the
district court's reasoning that negligence by the state or its politi-
cal subdivisions does not create a cause of action when the state
breaches a duty supposedly owed to the general public rather than
individuals. That logic, the supreme court observed, has been char-
acterized by "less kind commentators" as a theory "which results
in a duty to none where there is a duty to all."
1 4
The Supreme Court of Florida had previously espoused this
"general duty"-"special duty" dichotomy in Modlin v. City of
Miami Beach,'5 a case decided before the enactment of section
768.28 of the Florida Statutes. 6 Modlin arose from a claim that a
city building inspector had negligently examined a retail shop's
storage mezzanine, which later collapsed and crushed a patron.
The supreme court dismissed the claim, holding that the city was
not vicariously liable because it did not owe the injured plaintiff a
duty different from the duty owed to the public at large.' 7
In Cheney, the Third District followed Modlin's rationale,
concluding that section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes
does not create a liability in the State where the act complained
of does not give rise to liability in the agent committing the act,
appropriate agency, and also, except as to any claim against a municipality,
presents such claim in writing to the Department of Insurance, within 3 years
after such claim accrues and the Department of Insurance or the appropriate
agency denies the claim in writing.
12. The supreme court's jurisdiction over the two actions rested on different grounds.
The district court's disposition of Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 342 So.
2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), allegedly conflicted with Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach,
321 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). The Third District certified Cheney v. Dade County, 353
So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) as raising a question of great public interest. Supreme court
jurisdiction vested pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (amended 1980) (current ver-
sion at FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4)).
13. 371 So. 2d at 1015.
14. Id.
15. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
16. 371 So. 2d at 1016.
17. 201 So. 2d at 76.
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because the duty claimed to be violated is a duty owed to the
citizens of the state in general and is not a duty owed to a par-
ticular person or persons.18
In Commercial Carrier, the Supreme Court of Florida firmly re-
jected this language and the Modlin doctrine, declaring that a
"plain reading" of the statute denies any construction that the leg-
islature intended to codify the existing judicial rules of municipal
sovereign immunity. 19
The supreme court then examined the scope of the waiver of
immunity envisioned by section 768.28. Analogizing the Florida
statute to the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United
States of the "almost identical" language in the relevant sections
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 0 the Supreme Court of Florida
concluded that the statutory waiver of municipal immunity ex-
tends to the performance of governmental functions not performed
by private individuals." The court in Commercial Carrier recog-
nized, however, that certain governmental activities still fall
outside the scope of the statute and are thus immune from
liability.
22
18. Cheney v. Dade County, 353 So. 2d at 626. The Cheney court cited Spangler v.
State Turnpike Auth., 106 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1958), as direct authority for the statement:
"The Supreme Court of Florida has held that statutes purporting to waive sovereign immu-
nity are to be strictly construed and that such waiver should not be implied." 353 So. 2d at
626. The Third District's reliance on this case, which preceded section 768.28 by 17 years,
may partially explain Cheney's reversal.
19. 371 So. 2d at 1016.
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1976), noted in 371 So. 2d at 1016 & n.9 (citing Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (federal government held liable for damage
caused by Coast Guard's negligent maintainance of a lighthouse)). The Commercial Carrier
court quoted extensively from Indian Towing in describing the government's interpretation
of the language of the federal waiver of immunity:
"But the Government contends that the language of § 2674 ... imposing liabil-
ity 'in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances . . . ' must be read as excluding liability in the performance
of activities which private persons do not perform. Thus there would be no lia-
bility for negligent performance of 'uniquely governmental functions.' The Gov-
ernment reads the statute as if it imposed liability to the same extent as would
be imposed on a private individual 'under the same circumstances.' But the stat-
utory language is 'under like circumstances,' and it is hornbook tort law that one
who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance must
perform his 'good Samaritan' task in a careful manner.
371 So. 2d at 1016 (quoting 350 U.S. at 64-65).
21. Thus, the language of section 768.28(5) of the Florida Statutes imposing liability
"in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances" does not limit state and municipal liability to activities that only private persons
perform. 371 So. 2d at 1016-17.
22. See 371 So. 2d at 1017-22. The existence and nature of an exception to the statu-
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In considering what municipal acts may be outside the scope
of section 768.28i the court examined the case law of several states
that exempt certain areas of governmental conduct from scrutiny
by judge or jury." Perhaps the most significant of these cases was
Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State,2 ' which involved an
action by property owners against the State of Washington for
damages caused by a fire set by an escapee from a state reforma-
tory. Predicating their action on a Washington statute2 5 similar to
section 768.28 (1) of the Florida Statutes, the plaintiffs alleged
that the state negligently permitted the escape when it knew or
should have known that the escapee was a pyromaniac. The state
argued, however, that because its acts involved the exercise of ad-
ministrative judgment and discretion, it could still invoke sover-
eign immunity as a defense .2  The Supreme Court of Washington
concluded that the state legislature clearly intended to abolish the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, but with certain exceptions more
limited than those embodied in the Federal Tort Claims Act.29 The
Washington statute "does not render the state liable for every
harm that may flow from governmental action," the court ex-
plained, nor does it make the state "a surety for every governmen-
tal enterprise involving an element of risk." '
The Evangelical court first considered where in the realm of
governmental activity "orthodox tort liability stops and the act of
governing begins. '31 It noted that "it is not a tort for government
to govern.' ' 2 In the words of Commercial Carrier, Evangelical
tory waiver was a matter for judicial determination because, unlike the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), § 768.28 does not contain an express exception for discre-
tionary acts.
23. 371 So. 2d at 1017-20.
24. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
25. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.92.090 (1961) (amended 1963), provided in part: "The state of
Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, hereby consents to
the maintaining of a suit or action against it for damages arising out of its tortious conduct
to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation."
The 1963 amendment replaced the phrase, "hereby consents to the maintaining of a
suit or action against it for damages" with "shall be liable for damages." 1963 Wash. Laws,
ch. 159, § 2.
26. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1981), provides a general waiver of sovereign immunity for
the state, its agencies, and its subdivisions.
27. 67 Wash. 2d at 248, 407 P.2d at 441.
28. Id. at 252, 407 P.2d at 443.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 253, 407 P.2d at 444, quoted in 371 So. 2d at 1019.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)).
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"recognized that the legislative, judicial and purely executive
processes of government, including discretionary acts and decisions
within the framework of such processes, cannot and should not be
characterized as tortious.' 3 s In attempting to fashion a line of de-
marcation that would preserve sovereign immunity for "truly dis-
cretionary" but not merely ministerial functions, the Evangelical
court proposed a four-part test that was quoted at length in Com-
mercial Carrier:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily in-
volve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is
the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realiza-
tion or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as
opposed to one which would not change the course or direction
of the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omission,
or decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judg-
ment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency in-
volved? (4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the
requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty
to do or make the challenged act, omission, or decision? If these
preliminary questions can be clearly and unequivocally an-
swered in the affirmative, then the challenged act, omission, or
decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance, be classified
as a discretionary government process and nontortious, regard-
less of its unwisdom. If, however, one or more of the questions
call for or suggest a negative answer, then further inquiry may
well become necessary, depending upon the facts and circum-
stances involved.
8 '
After finding Evangelical's four-part test persuasive in Com-
mercial Carrier, the Supreme Court of Florida discussed one of its
earlier decisions, Wong v. City of Miami.15 In Wong, merchants
whose business premises were damaged when a rally culminated in
civil disorder sued the City of Miami and Dade County for negli-
gent failure to contain the rally. While impliedly conceding the de-
fendants' negligence, the supreme court held that it was not ac-
tionable because of sovereign immunity."0 The court declared,
"'The sovereign authorities ought to be left free to exercise their
discretion and choose the tactics deemed appropriate without
worry over possible allegations of negligence." "'
33. 371 So. 2d at 1018-19.
34. 67 Wash. 2d at 255, 407 P.2d at 445, quoted in 371 So. 2d at 1019.
35. 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1970).
36. See 371 So. 2d at 1020 (explanation of Wong).
37. 371 So. 2d at 1020 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wong, 237 So. 2d at 134).
[Vol. 35:999
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Relying on Evangelical and Wong, the Commercial Carrier
court emphasized the "distinct principle of law . . which makes
not actionable in tort certain judgmental decisions of governmental
authorities which are inherent in the act of governing."8 8 It then
developed a test for identifying such "discretionary" governmental
functions, ultimately adopting the "planning"-"operational" di-
chotomy that had been developed by the federal and California
courts: 9
Although it may not be possible to set forth a definitive rule
which would determine in every instance whether a governmen-
tal agency is liable for discretionary acts of its officials, various
factors furnish a means of deciding whether the agency in a par-
ticular case should have immunity, such as the importance to
the public of the function involved, the extent to which govern-
ment[al] liability might impair free exercise of the function, and
the availabilty to individuals affected of remedies other than
tort suits for damages.'
0
The court expressly adopted the above planning-operational analy-
sis as a judicial aid in isolating the discretionary functions of gov-
ernment that should be immune from tort liability despite broad
statutory waiver, and, at the same time, "commended" Evangeli-
cal's four-pronged preliminary test.'1
The other issues treated by Commercial Carrier were primar-
ily procedural, involving the notice requirements for filing claims
under section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes,'2 and the question
whether the statute pertains to either contribution or indemnity.
On the latter issue, the supreme court stated: "Actions for contri-
bution or indemnity grounded on the tortious conduct of the state
38. 371 So. 2d at 1020 (citing Judge Fuld's opinion in Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167
N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960) (pedestrian unable to recover against city for injuries
allegedly caused by inadequate traffic signal "clearance interval" on grounds that discretion-
ary decision by governmental official not actionable in tort)).
39. The Commercial Carrier court traced the development of the planning-operational
analysis of sovereign immunity to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), in which the Supreme Court construed the
Federal Tort Claims Act. 371 So. 2d at 1021. The Supreme Court of California articulated a
planning-operational test first in Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961), and later in Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447
P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). See 371 So. 2d at 1021.
40. 371 So. 2d at 1021 (quoting Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99).
41. 371 So. 2d at 1022. For an explication of the Evangelical test, see text accompany-
ing notes 32-34 supra.
42. 371 So. 2d at 1022. The court held that compliance with FLA. STAT. § 768.28(6) is a
condition precedent to maintaining an action against the state. 371 So. 2d at 1022.
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or its agencies and subdivisions are no less tort claims for purposes
of section 768.28 than direct actions.
43
Florida courts have adhered to the tests developed in Com-
mercial Carrier for determining municipal liability. At first, there
was some doubt about the efficacy of the tests. For example, in
Wallace v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.," the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, observed that the now-extinct
Modlin rule was "at least easy to discern and apply."' 5 By con-
trast, the court found that the Evangelical-Commercial Carrier
test was "complex" and might be construed "either to exempt each
and every governmental action, or alternatively, exclude none of
them."' 6 Additionally, the Wallace court speculated with concern
on the "specter of governmental authorities being found negligent
and liable for the routine acts and inspections by their building
and plumbing officials. . . [and on] what might come forth out of
the State's requirement that automobiles be routinely inspected.'
47
Nonetheless, the Fourth District easily interpreted the Com-
mercial Carrier test in Relyea v. State,'48 which involved two stu-
dents who had been attacked and killed on a state college cam-
pus.49 The plaintiffs alleged that the state had failed to provide
adequate security on the campus. Relying on the Commercial Car-
rier test, the court held that "the allegations of negligence fall
within the definition of discretionary function. Whether to provide
security guards, parking attendants, [and] security gates . . . are
clearly discretionary decisions, partially based upon budgetary lim-
itations controlled by the legislature." 50
Other lower courts in Florida have applied Commercial Car-
rier's analysis to a great variety of situations, illustrating the case's
inevitable impact. For example, in Weston v. State,51 the District
Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed the trial court's dismissal
43. Id.
44. 376 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
45. Id. at 40.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Wallace court concluded that "the possible permutations resulting in the
Government bearing the financial responsibility for the misdeeds of the private sector, sim-
ply because it is trying to safeguard the general public by regulatory action, is staggering."
Id.
48. 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
49. Id. at 1380.
50. Id. at 1382. The complaint in Relyea had alleged that the state university had a
mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to provide reasonable security for all persons lawfully on
the campus, particularly students. Id. at 1380.
51. 373 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
[Vol. 35:9991006
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of a complaint alleging that a state attorney had maliciously prose-
cuted and caused the false imprisonment of the plaintiff. The state
attorney had advised a grand jury during its pre-indictment inves-
tigation of the plaintiff, who was a county official. The criminal
trial court subsequently dismissed the criminal action, finding that
the statute on which the indictment was based did not apply to the
official.52 In concluding that the exonerated official did not have an
actionable claim, the First District held that, under Commercial
Carrier, "[tihe state attorney's action in this case, as advisor to the
grand jury, qualifies as a 'certain "discretionary" governmental
function' the performance of which is not affected by the statute
waiving sovereign immunity."53
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has applied the
holding of Commercial Carrier to cases involving allegations of
faulty highway construction and inadequate warnings of impend-
ing riots. In Neilson v. Department of Transportation," the plain-
tiffs brought a negligence action against a state agency and a
county for damages incurred in a traffic accident. The complaint
alleged that the defendants' negligent design and construction of a
public road, combined with their failure to provide adequate warn-
ing devices and signals at the accident site, resulted in personal
injuries and property damage. 5  The District Court of Appeal, Sec-
ond District, reversed the trial court's dismissal of the case, stating
that although most, if not all, of the allegations appeared to in-
volve discretionary actions under Commercial Carrier, the trial
court should gather additional evidence before making a final
determination."
Six weeks later in Ellmer v. City of St. Petersburg,57 the Sec-
ond District again relied on Commercial Carrier. In Ellmer, the
City of St. Petersburg allegedly failed to warn its residents of an
impending riot. The court held that any negligence attributable to
the city fell within the scope of its discretionary planning function.
52. Id. at 702.
53. Id. (quoting Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1022). The policy considerations
relating to the needs of the judicial system greatly influenced the court. It reasoned that a
state attorney must be able to enforce the law free from any apprehension that he might be
subject to liability for acts performed in exercising his discretionary duties. The court feared
that curbing the exercise of the state attorney's judgment in prosecuting crimes would crip-
ple law enforcement and related judicial activities. Id. at 703.
54. 376 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 378 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
19811 1007
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The court observed that the exigencies of the circumstances re-
quired that the city be free to exercise its discretion in meeting its
larger responsibility to provide police protection during the riot.
Accordingly, the court rejected "the idea that any planning level
function must occur back at headquarters and that any decision
made on the scene necesarily be operational. Sometimes, only per-
sons in the field can make effective plans."58
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, examined the
character of governmental functions in the area of highway safety
in A. L. Lewis Elementary School v. Metropolitan Dade County."
In Lewis, an automobile struck a student in an intersection adja-
cent to school grounds. The court concluded that designating traf-
fic zones and installing traffic signals and pedestrian control de-
vices are discretionary policy matters that involve planning and
judgment and therefore are not subject to traditional tort liabil-
ity.60 Sovereign immunity, however, would not apply if there was
"a statutory imposition of a duty on such governmental agencies to
establish and maintain such traffic regulation facilities." ' The
court found that in this case a statutory duty did exist, 2 and thus
reversed the trial court's order dismissing the complaint."
Another case decided by the Third District concerning the
scope of sovereign immunity was Weissberg v. City of Miami
Beach." In Weissberg, the plaintiff was injured in a traffic accident
at an intersection where equipment being used by a public utility
had obscured visibility. The utility company had hired a uni-
formed, off-duty city policeman to direct traffic at the site. The
policeman was allegedly negligent in performing his duties. The
Third District reversed the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of the city,65 using the tests developed in Commercial Carrier
to reject the city's argument that placing the policeman at the site
involved a planning function." The court discerned no difference
58. Id. at 827.
59. 376 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
60. Id. at 34.
61. Id.
62. The court referred to FLA. STAT. § 316.1895 (1975), which directed the Florida De-
partment of Transportation to adopt a system for installing traffic control devices in areas
surrounding public and private schools.
63. 376 So. 2d at 35. See also Universal Dry Wall, Inc. v. Dade County, 375 So. 2d 573
(Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
64. 383 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
65. Id. at 1159. The trial court rendered its summary judgment prior to the supreme
court's decision in Commercial Carrier.
66. Id. at 1158-59.
[Vol. 35:9991008
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between municipal liability for malfunctioning traffic devices, the
subject matter of Commercial Carrier, and for an inattentive po-
liceman directing traffic-in both cases, the state entity was en-
gaged in a purely operational procedure.
In Daniele v. Board of County Commissioners,6 the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, found that under Commercial
Carrier's interpretation of section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes, a
county was liable for its negligent failure to maintain public prop-
erty. There, the plaintiff was injured when his bicycle hit a pothole
in a county park 9 On facts somewhat similar to those of Daniele,
the District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, in Wojtan v. Her-
nando County,70 held that a county is not immune from a suit for
negligent maintenance of county roadway shoulders. In Wojtan,
poorly maintained highway shoulders caused injuries to a plaintiff
who had been operating a motor vehicle along the road.7 1 Commer-
cial Carrier, then, has been used to justify imposing liability on
government entities for all types of negligent behavior affecting
public property.
72
Overall, Commercial Carrier and its progeny suggest that the
state cannot be held liable for a discretionary decision within the
ambit of its authority; the execution of that decision is ministerial
and, therefore, subject to judicial review.
67. Id. at 1159.
68. 375 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
69. Id.
70. 379 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
71. Id. at 199. The court reversed the trial court's judgment on the pleadings based
upon Commercial Carrier, which was decided while the case was on appeal. For another
roadway maintenance case, see State Dep't of Transp. v. Eades, 383 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1980) (state liable for injuries sustained by police officer who fell through drainage
grating on shoulder of public highway). See also Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d
379 (Fla. 1981) (city found liable for injuries caused by dangerous condition of road shoulder
although the limit on damages imposed by FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1981) constitutionally re-
duced recovery).
72. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, recently used the tests developed in
Commercial Carrier to defeat liability in a case in which the plaintiffs did not allege any
negligent behavior. In Rumbough v. City of Tampa, 403 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981),
property owners appealed the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment in an
action in which they had alleged that the City of Tampa's non-negligent operation of a
sanitary landfill caused damage to their home. In affirming the trial court's decision, the
Second District concluded that in the absence of any allegation of negligence on the part of
the city, its operation of the landfill was a discretionary function that could not create liabil-
ity. Id. at 1141-42.
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III. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
In section 768.28(1) of the Florida Statutes, Florida waived
sovereign tort immunity for the state, its agencies, and its subdivi-
sions, with the caveat that the waiver is effective "only to the ex-
tent specified" in the statute. 78 The remaining thirteen subsections
of section 768.28 limit and define the scope of this general waiver.7 4
The following discussion will review the 1979 and 1980 cases that
have further shaped and defined the application of section
768.28 7' and will examine several significant legislative
amendments.7
The District Court of Appeal, First District, construed the
general waiver of section 768.28 in Hollis v. School Board. In
Hollis, the estate of a deceased five-year-old child sued a county
school superintendent claiming that the alleged negligence of a
school bus driver caused the child's death. The trial court granted
the superintendent's motion for sunimary judgment, absolving him
from liability, and the estate appealed. Because section 768.28(1)
limits the state's liability to that of a private person in similar cir-
cumstances, the court first considered whether, in the private sec-
tor, the superintendent would be liable for the bus driver's negli-
gence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.7 8 To resolve this
issue, the court had to determine whether the bus driver was an
73. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1981) provides in part:
Actions at law against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to recover
damages in tort for money damages against the state or its agencies or subdivi-
sions for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death caused by the negli-
gent or wrongful act of omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision
while acting within the scope of his office or employment under circumstances in
which the state or such agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the general laws of this state, may be prose-
cuted subject to the limitations specified in this act.
74. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.28(2)-(14) (1981).
75. See, e.g., Beard v. Hambrick, 396 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1981) (construing FLA. STAT. §
768.28(1), (2), (6), (12) (Supp. 1974) (subsection (1) amended 1981)); District School Bd. v.
Talmadge, 381 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1980) (construing FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(1975) (amended
1979, 1980, 1981)); Department of Transp. v. Knowles, 388 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
(construing FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1977) (amended 1981)); Hollis v. School Bd., 384 So. 2d
661 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (construing FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1)-(2) (1977) (subsection (1)
amended 1981)); West v. Wainright, 380 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (construing FLA.
STAT. § 768.28(6) (1979)); State v. Yant, 360 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (construing FLA.
STAT. § 768.28(5) (1975) (amended 1977, 1981)).
76. See, e.g., 1981 Fla. Laws ch. 81-317 § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9) (1979));
1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-253, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.28(13) (1977)).
77. 384 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
78. Id. at 662-63.
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employee of the superintendent as well as of the school board."
The First District concluded that the superintendent was an em-
ployer of the bus driver and thus could be held vicariously liable
for the driver's negligent acts.80
The Hollis court then considered whether the employer of a
negligent employee is a state entity under section 768.28(2), which
lists the organizations included within the terms "state agencies or
subdivisions."81 The court noted that cases addressing the issue
under the Federal Tort Claims Act 2 look to whether the employee
is an integral part of the government. Because the superintendent's
activities as both the administrator and chief executive officer of
the school board were essential to the effective functioning of the
board, the court concluded that the "superintendent. . . is an in-
tegral part of the government and must be considered an agency as
that term is defined in Section 768.28(2)."83
Section 768.28(5) of the Florida Statutes" limits the state's li-
ability for tort claims to $100,000 for any individual's claim, and to
a total of $200,000 for claims arising from any single incident or
occurrence. If a judgment exceeds these limits, the claimant may
report the excess to the legislature, "but may be paid in part or in
whole only by further act of the legislature. '"85 Subsection (5) also
preserves the state's immunity from claims for "punitive damages
79. Id. at 662.
80. Id. at 663-64.
81. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(2) (1981) provides that "'state agencies or subdivisions' include
the executive departments, the Legislature, the judicial branch, and. . . [the] counties and
municipalities; and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the
state, counties, or municipalities."
82. The Hollis court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976) defines "federal agency" to
include the executive and military departments, the independent establishments of the
United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the
United States. 384 So. 2d at 664 n.6.
83. 384 So. 2d at 664. But see 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 078-145 (Dec. 21, 1978), which
summarized this issue as follows:
Under the provisions of the general law waiving sovereign immunity in tort
for state agencies or subdivisions, as defined in Section 768.28(2), F.S., actions
may be brought against a mosquito control district for the negligent acts or
omissions of its officers or employees committed within the scope of their au-
thority. The officers of employees of the district may be held individually or
personally liable, however, for those acts or omissions committed in bad faith or
with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of
human rights, safety or property. Florida appellate court decisions are in conflict
as to whether the officers or employees of a governmental entity are immune
from suit for negligent acts or omissions committed within the scope of their
authority.
84. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1981).
85. Id.
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or interest for the period prior to judgment."" The Florida cases
construing section 768.28(5) literally interpret its plain language.
The courts have consistently held, for example, that the limitation
on individual claims, which is now $100,000, "does not apply to
separate claims by different individuals in the same lawsuit. '8 7  .
It remains unclear whether courts may order the state to pay
costs and interest in excess of the statutory limit. The First and
Second District Courts of Appeal have held that a trial court may
tax costs above the limitation of section 768.28(5) "to the same ex-
tent and in the same manner" that it taxes costs against private
individuals."8 In contrast, the Third District has held that the pay-
ment "of post-judgment interest and costs are recoverable, but
only to the extent that the total of the judgment for damages and
the post-judgment interest and costs [do] not exceed" the statu-
tory limit.89
Section 768.28(6) of the Florida Statutes conditions the state's
broad waiver of sovereign immunity by prohibiting an action "un-
less the claimant presents the claim in writing to the appropriate
agency, and also. . . presents such claim in writing to the Depart-
ment of Insurance within 3 years after such claim accrues and the
Department of Insurance or the appropriate agency denies the
claim in writing." 90 In Hutchins v. Mills,91 a pre-Commercial Car-
rier case, the trial court had decided that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction of an action because the plaintiff did not comply with
86. Id.; see Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1981) (statutory ceiling
on amount of money damages recoverable against municipality is constitutional); Berek v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 396 So. 2d 756, 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
87. Department of Transp. v. Knowles, 388 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); e.g.,
State v. Yant, 360 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). When the First and Second Districts
decided Knowles and Yant, the individual recovery limit under § 768.28(5) was $50,000, and
the occurrence recovery limit was $100,000. The legislature amended subsection (5) in 1981
to raise the limits to $100,000 and $200,000 respectively. 1981 Fla. Laws, ch. 81-317, § 1.
In Yant, a minor child sustanied serious injuries because of a state agency's alleged negli-
gence. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with a jury verdict of $125,000 for the
injured child and $26,000 for the medical bills paid by the mother. The First District rea-
soned that the claim of the injured minor child was separate and distinct from his parent's
claim for resulting medical expenses. 360 So. 2d at 101.
88. Department of Transp. v. Knowles, 388 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); State
v. Yant, 360 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
89. Berek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 396 So. 2d 756, 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
90. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(6) (1981). Subsection (6) also provides that "[tihe failure of the
Department of Insurance or the appropriate agency to make final disposition of a claim
within 6 months after it is filed shall be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of
this section."
.-..91. 363 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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the notice requirement for filing a claim." The District Court of
Appeal, First District, disagreed with the trial court,9" analogizing
section 768.28(6) to an earlier statute that, as a prerequisite to su-
ing a municipality, had required plaintiffs notify the municipality
of potential claims within ninety days of the occurrence or discov-
ery of an injury.9' The court then noted that the Supreme Court of
Florida had held "that a municipality may waive or be estopped to
assert the benefit" of such notice statutes.'5 The First District rea-
soned that since a defendant may waive notice requirements, the
plaintiff's failure to give notice does not deprive the court of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.9"
If the notice requirements of a local ordinance conflict with
the terms of section 768.28(6), the latter will prevail. In Scavella v.
Fernandez,97 for example, the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, examined a Dade County ordinance s that required claimants
to file a claim with the county commission within sixty days of the
alleged injury. 9 The court concluded that the ordinance conflicted
with section 768.28(6), which allows claimants three years in which
to file, and was therefore invalid: "What the legislature hath
granted, the commission may not take away-even in part."' "
The Scavella holding does not directly apply, however, if the
plaintiff's injury occurred before the effective date of section
768.28(6). In Cooper v. Dade County,101 the plaintiff alleged that
the negligence of Dade County hospital employees caused her inju-
ries. The trial court entered a directed verdict for the county be-
cause the plaintiff did not notify the county of her claim within
sixty days, as required by the Dade County ordinance.101 The
92. Id. at 821.
93. The First District affirmed the trial court decision, however, on other grounds. The
court held that since the plaintiff did not allege or present evidence of waiver or estoppel,
the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claim for failing to comply with notice re-
quirement of § 768.28(6). 363 So. 2d at 821.
94. The court compared FLA. STAT. § 768.28(6) (1981) with FLA. STAT. § 95.241 (1973)
(amended 1974).
95. 363 So. 2d at 821 (citing Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Island, 178 So. 2d 9
(Fla. 1965)).
96. 363 So. 2d at 821.
97. 371 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
98. METRO. DADE CTY., FLA., CODE § 2-2 (1981).
99. The county had argued that there was no conflict because a claimant could comply
with both the county ordinance and the statute by giving notice within sixty days. The
Scavella court criticized this reasoning as "entirely unsound." 363 So. 2d at 536.
100. Id. at 537.
101. 384 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
102. Mmo. DADE CTY., FLA., CODE § 2-2 (1981).
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Third District concluded that its Scavella holding did not control
the decision because section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes was not
effective until fifteen days after the plaintiff's accident. 03 None-
theless, the court applied Scavella's reasoning to the one-year no-
tice requirement of another Florida statute 04 that conflicted with
and thus overrode the county ordinance. 0 5
In West v. Wainwrighte06 the District Court of Appeal, First
District, articulated an exception to the notice requirement of sec-
tion 768.28(6). A state prisoner had sued officers of the Florida De-
partment of Corrections, both individually and as state officials,
alleging that they negligently and maliciously denied him dietary
and medical treatment while he was imprisoned. 0 7 The First Dis-
trict affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint against
the state because the plaintiff had not complied with the statutory
notice requirements. But the court also partially reversed, because
"insofar as appellant's complaint alleged deliberate mistreatment
...the complaint stated a cause of action against the appellees
individually, for which section 768.28(6) does not require a written
claim upon the state or its agencies."' 0 8
Section 768.28(9) of the Florida Statutes'09 governs the per-
sonal tort liability of public employees. Over the past few years,
this subsection has undergone significant legislative revision and
judicial review. In District School Board v. Talmadge,'1 the Su-
preme Court of Florida interpreted an apparent inconsistency in
the 1975 version of subsection (9)"1 to determine whether a plain-
103. 384 So. 2d at 222.
104. FLA. STAT. § 95.08 (1965) (repealed 1975) (barring claims against a county unless
presented to county's board of commissioners within one year from "due").
105. 384 So. 2d at 222.
106. 380 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
107. Id. at 1339.
108. Id. Subsection (9) of § 768.28 implicitly permits state agents, officers, and employ-
ees to be sued individually if they act maliciously or in bad faith. See also County of Sara-
sota v. Wall, 403 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (county not entitled to new notice of claim
prior to institution of another suit on same claim).
109. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(a)-(b) (1981).
110. 381 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1980).
111. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9) (1975) (amended 1979, 1980 & 1981) provided:
(9) No officer, employee, or agent of the state or its subdivisions shall be held
personally liable in tort for any injuries or damages suffered as a result of any
act, event, or omission of action in the scope of his employment or function,
unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious pur-
pose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights,
safety, or property. Subject to the monetary limitations set forth in subsection
(5), the state shall pay any monetary judgment which is rendered in a civil ac-
tion personally against an officer, employee, or agent of the state which arises as
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tiff could sue a public employee as a party-defendant for the em-
ployee's alleged negligence while acting within the scope of his em-
ployment. The plaintiff in Talmadge, a public school student, had
sued the Lake County School Board, the Board's insurer, and a
school coach for injuries incurred when the coach forced him to
exercise on a trampoline.'12
The version of section 768.28(9) before the court was facially
ambiguous. The first sentence provided that public employees are
not personally liable in tort for damages resulting from acts within
the scope of their employment, unless they act maliciously or in
bad faith."" The second sentence, however, directed the state to
pay "any monetary judgment which is rendered in a civil action
personally against an officer, employee, or agent of the state,"''
subject, of course, to the recovery limitations of 768.28(5). The de-
fendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the first sen-
tence immunized public employees from suit, and that only mali-
cious or bad faith activity could trigger the second sentence and
expose the employees to liability and the state to an indemnity
obligation. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that the two
sentences read together indemnified, but did not immunize, public
employees." 6 The trial court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed,
holding that the statute indemnified state employees from mone-
tary judgments, but did not forbid suits against a state employee
as a party-defendant." 6
The supreme court affirmed on appeal. The court first ac-
knowledged the legislature's ambiguous treatment in section
768.28(9) of the "coexistence" of employee and governmental lia-
bility. 7 Then, finding no relevant analogy in the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the court looked for similar legislation in other juris-
dictions."' Although it did not discover a comparable statute, the
court found it significant that almost every jurisdiction permitted
tort suits against both the government and its employees. This fact
suggested to the court that "the absence of an explicit prohibition
a result of any act, event, or omission of action within the scope of his employ-
ment or function.
112. 381 So. 2d at 699.
113. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9) (1975).
114. Id.
115. 381 So. 2d at 700-01.
116. Talmadge v. District School Bd., 355 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
117. 381 So. 2d at 700.
118. Id. at 701-02.
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against suing public employees for their torts suggests that none
was intended." 119 The court ultimately relied, however, on the
maxim of statutory construction that "'[w]here possible, it is the
duty of the courts to adopt that construction of a statutory provi-
sion which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions of
the same act.' ,,1,o To give "content to each sentence" of subsection
(9), the court construed the statute to allow plaintiffs to sue public
employees as party defendants."1 Subsection (9) does not immu-
nize employees; rather, it "merely addresses the extent to which
the state will be liable for their torts." ' For example, if a plaintiff
sues the state and a public employee jointly, the state must pay
any judgments up to the monetary limitations set forth in subsec-
tion (5). The negligent employee will be "personally liable for that
portion of a judgment rendered against him which exceeds the
state's liability limits." '
In 1979, the legislature amended section 768.28(9) to remove
the inconsistency that had troubled the Talmadge court.2 4 The
legislature deleted the entire second sentence, dealing with the
state's responsibility to pay damages. The legislature also revised
the first sentence to provide that a public employee shall not "be
held personally liable in tort for a final judgment which has been
rendered against him," and which resulted from acts committed
within the scope of his employment, unless he had acted mali-
119. Id. at 702.
120. Id. at 702 (quoting Woodgate Dev. Corp. v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 351 So. 2d 14, 16
(Fla. 1977)).
121. 381 So. 2d at 702.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 703. The Florida Supreme Court distinguished its holding from that of the
lower court in Talmadge because "subsection (9) goes beyond mere reimbursement and re-
quires the state to pay judgments directly." Id. at 703 n.21. It then observed that
"[jjudgments in excess of the limitations in subsection (5) can also 'be reported to the Legis-
lature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature.'" Id. at
703 n.22 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1975)).
124. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-139, § 6 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9) (1975)). As
amended, § 768.28(9) provides:
No officer, employee, or agent of the state or its subdivisions shall be held
personally liable in tort for a final judgment which has been rendered against
him for any injuries or damages suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission
of action in the scope of his employment or function, unless such officer, em-
ployee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.
Subsection 9 was amended again in 1981 to provide that public employees shall be adverse
witnesses in actions involving injuries caused by acts in the scope of their employment. 1981
Fla. Laws ch. 81-317, § 1.
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ciously or in bad faith.125 The following year, the legislature
amended subsection (9) again, eliminating any ambiguity that may
have remained. 12' The new amendment deleted the phrase in the
first sentence that had been added in 1979. Now a public employee
shall not "be held personally liable in tort or named as a party
defendant in any action" for nonmalicious acts committed within
the scope of his employment. 27 Another new provision expressly
provides that a claimant's exclusive remedy for torts committed by
public employees is an action against the appropriate governmen-
tal entity. The statute also specifies that the state is not liable for
acts committed by employees maliciously or in bad faith, or
outside the scope of their employment.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The important legislative changes and judicial interpretations
of the last several years have significantly affected the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in Florida. Although Florida's courts continue
to explore new theories and establish new guidelines regarding the
statutory waiver of immunity, unusual factual situations may re-
quire further amendment of the statute, or further interpretation
by the courts. These statutory and judicial changes in the law of
sovereign immunity, although retaining remnants of the ancient
doctrine, reflect the shift from "the King can do no wrong"' 29 to
the modern rationale that now justifies sovereign immunity: "It isnot a tort for government to govern."130
125. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-139, § 6 (underscored in original).
126. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-271, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.28(10) (1979)).
127. Id. (underscored in original).
128. Id. The 1980 amendment also expressly included volunteer firefighters within the
term "employee." Id.
129. See Borchard, supra note 1.
130. Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 253, 407 P.2d 440,
444 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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